The “Emergency Room” Approach

Posted on January 23, 2012 by Amb. Litt

Our national security policy debate is wrong-headed. Relying on our military forces alone to protect national security is the Emergency Room equivalent in our health policy debate. Too many sick people resort to the nearest Emergency Room for treatment – it is usually too late, and always too expensive for preventable care.

So it is with depending predominantly upon our military forces to resolve conflict, the threat of conflict, or even post-conflict stabilization. Too late, too expensive.

Furthermore, in health care we seem to have realized our excessive emphasis on high-tech, cutting-edge hyper-specializations in medicine, and the need to return attention to primary care, public health, family medicine, nurse practitioners, etc. The basics – and those equipped to perform them.

Where is the national security debate about resources and attention paid to “preventive” medicine and promoting “healthy life styles,” i.e., the effectiveness of economic, social and political development in violence-prone or stressed nations? Where is the shift toward resourcing the primary care givers: the diplomats and development specialists?

Our military is the best in the world by far, and has a useful and vital role in protecting our national security, but similarly we don’t need a nation full of neurosurgeons and cardiologists alone running our health care system.

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Education for the New Defense Strategy

Posted on January 11, 2012 by Amb. Litt

Following my last blog posting (January 3, 2012), I listened to the President and SecDef Panetta outline the elements of the new strategic guidance for the Department of Defense. My timing was good. The underlying themes of the DoD document reflect realities that I have referred to in past blogs. Explicit in the new guidance is the theme that the US military will no longer go it alone, and will develop a force structure accordingly. Appropriate nods to diplomacy and development are there, but more evident are the concepts of coalition, alliance, interoperability, and building partnership capacity. Agility, flexibility, and versatility are also dominant themes. In short, teamwork – military and civilian, public and private, US and international – will be the template for most future US military operations under this strategy.

So, gone is the attitude that the US military in a crisis can always work better, and be more successful, when it is in the lead and sometimes, just alone. Good riddance. We will henceforth establish effective partnerships, teams and networks. Thus, the need for a new educational curriculum across the new collaborative dimensions in the fields of crisis preparedness, prevention and response. The missions that the strategy document listed provide clear guidance as to where we still need to sew some seams in our ability to collaborate with other organizational cultures.

The last four missions in particular are areas in which educational programming is called for:
• Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. Cooperation among NGOs, local authorities, US military, corporations, and federal agencies can be just as problematic at home as it is overseas in the aftermath of a disaster.
• Provide a Stabilizing Presence. Just as DoD and other US interagency partners strive to collaborate more effectively, so do our major allies. We should anticipate that many more of our partners will also want to emulate this model. Preparations for more effective presence operations should include education, training, exercises among and between militaries and civilian agencies across borders.
• Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. It is right to scale back DoD’s involvement in “nation-building” and prolonged stability operations. I believe, in fact, that COIN doctrine was never designed as such. Civilian and private/voluntary sector entities should be a substantial part of our strategies to deal with conflict and instability, much more than they are today to be sure. However, this requires significant retooling in the way we all approach pre- and post-conflict response, cognitively, attitudinally, and operationally. Education is key.
• Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. Ditto on the role of non-military actors in humanitarian operations. The QDDR specifically designates USAID as the lead agency for US international humanitarian crisis response. Lashing up the extraordinary military capabilities the US enjoys, with those of other organizations responding to a crisis, in an effective and efficient network, does not come naturally. It requires the same “retooling” as stabilization and COIN operations, and therefore dedicated educational programing.

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Austerity Budgets and Crisis Response: the Case for Education

Posted on January 3, 2012 by Amb. Litt

Educating professionals who respond to crises is not a luxury but a necessity, especially in the era of fiscal austerity. The USG (including the military), NGOs, international organizations and the private sector will not all suddenly stop responding to crises, whether conflict or disaster, domestic or international. Some entities will drop out, and others dial way back, but nearly all organizations that stay in the game will have to find ways to cope with shrinking budgets, and still “get the job done” – however they define that. Developing new curricula to educate all of these organizations together is a cheap way to lead to success in responding to people and governments in need, when resources are growing scarce.

The US government will likely focus more on creating new response strategies, different bureaucratic mechanisms, and specialized funding accounts – but I am less confident that Uncle Sam will devote funds to educating our personnel in collaboration and cooperation, particularly with non-military, non-governmental counterparts. Other organizations will also devise their own efficiencies, particularly as funding streams dry up. Many will come to the realization that cooperation is an essential way to do the same with less. But few will spend time, energy and resources on influencing the way their personnel think about responding to crisis. In fact, I believe that efforts to effectively shape our attitudes and approaches toward collaboration, synergy, and sharing resources, will – counter intuitively – drift lower on many organizations’ priority lists. Most organizations will also cut their overall training and education budgets. If anything remains in the education budget, I am concerned that it will emphasize only the minimum necessary internal and tactical training for immediate operations.

Instead, what is required for short-, medium- and long-term crisis response effectiveness is improving our ability to accomplish our tasks cooperatively across organizational cultures. Crises are not going away; in fact, they are increasing in number and impact. Changing our bureaucratic mechanisms and processes towards cooperation, without changing the way we as professionals perceive the value of cooperation, accomplishes little. Education across organizations is the most effective way to shape this thinking collaboratively, and to staff the old and new bureaucracies with personnel capable of planning and implementing strategies in a cooperative fashion.

NEXT: What the new curriculum could contain.

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Yemen Poses a Strategic Threat

Posted on March 22, 2011 by Amb. Litt

As readers of this commentary already know, I firmly believe that, of all of the current conflicts unfolding in the Middle East, Yemen poses the greatest strategic threat to the US and the region. It is a nation that has suffered civil war, rebellion, secession movements, and violent extremist infiltration, all in the past 20 years or so.

The cracks and fissures still run throughout the political and social fabric. A clever, tactically savvy, but imperfect autocrat has held that fabric together; it is not clear to me that a successor government could fare so well given the current internal instability.

I am not a Yemen expert, but I strongly believe that Yemen can only come out of its current troubles with massive and transparent political and economic support from its immediate neighbors, especially the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia, in close coordination and cooperation with the international donor community that has long been supporting Yemen’s development over the decades. That would include the US, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UN. Yemen will not be able to withstand the tides of instability alone. The dangers of a failed Yemeni state are potentially catastrophic for the Arabian Peninsula region and for the United States.

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Intervening in Libya

Posted on March 14, 2011 by Amb. Litt

The Administration’s pace and direction over Libya is correct. We must intervene only as part of a combined effort, with a clear consensus on the goals of the intervention. The justifications for intervention are plentiful, beginning with the UN’s doctrine of the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its people.  We do not need to belabor that issue. The US has the wherewithal to provide major logistical, intelligence and command/control support for an international effort to stop the Qaddhafi regime from decimating its own people. Our power is incontrovertible.

But the U.S. must not succumb to the pleas of those around the world who demand of the U.S.: “Let’s you and him fight!” Individuals and governments are all too ready to have the U.S. battle for their cause, for U.S. blood and treasure to be devoted on their behalf. We can and will do that if our national security interests require. But other regional states– European, Arab, and African — must have “skin in the game.” They must physically participate in transparent and accountable ways in the effort to end the Qaddhafi rule. And we must be prepared to coordinate when matters don’t go in the direction we expected. Thus the importance of agreeing in advance as to where we are ultimately headed.

There is a bigger issue at stake as well, beyond that of Libya:  nations of the world must develop effective ways to impose their collective will on deviant governments that defy international law and the collective will as represented by the UN and Security Council. This was the issue with Iraq and the Balkans, it is still the issue with Iran, and now it has become the issue (once again!) with Libya.

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Foreign Aid and National Security

Posted on February 16, 2011 by Amb. Litt

It is maddening to hear calls in Congress to sacrifice “foreign aid” as a purported deficit-cutting strategy while fires are still smoldering in the Middle East. Compare that strategy to those critics who slammed the government for shoring up dictators and militaries while ignoring much needed support to democracy promotion. I suspect that if we compare the two scripts, the speakers are the same. But never mind who said what; the fact remains that robust development and diplomatic strategies, fully resourced and wisely implemented, accomplish three things.

 They help fulfill America’s promise of supporting freedom and democracy around the world, they provide the greatest chance of long-term stability in unstable regions, and they accomplish this at a fraction of the cost of the Defense Department budget while saving our military forces from spending precious time away from their main mission. It is no wonder that DoD, and Secretary Gates in particular, have lobbied persistently and loudly in favor of resourcing diplomacy and development as equal partners in America’s national security strategy.

The US Foreign Service establishment knows how to support the spread of democratic values: participation, transparency and accountability in governance. We know how to help nations develop the institutions necessary for democratic transitions – in close collaboration with NGOs, international organizations, the private sector, other nations, and most importantly with the affected nation itself. That would include both the government and civil society.

In 1991, the military dictatorship of the African nation of Niger – one of two African nations participating in Desert Shield/Desert Storm – voluntarily sought the assistance of the United States, France, Canada, and other nations, as well as the UN, to transition to a multiparty democracy. The US Embassy country team, including USAID, the US Information Service (still alive then), the Office of Military Cooperation, and other agencies, collaborated with their counterparts in the Nigerien government and civil society, with the UN, and with other bilateral donors to undertake the legal and regulatory changes necessary to make the transition happen. The first elections were held in 1993 to great acclaim, but alas, the experiment faltered after a few years, and is now on life support, as I understand it. I would argue that some of blame lies with those, including the US, who failed to sustain the democratic effort through continuous programs of education, training, and support throughout society. Likely a victim of cutbacks in foreign assistance programs – “foreign aid.” West Africa, Europe, and even the US, are once again paying the price of instability, terrorism, injustice, and poverty in the Sahel region.

Do not listen to the siren song of deficit reduction to slash the foreign assistance budget, and foreign operations. Foreign assistance, devised and implemented properly, is an essential component of the national security strategy. We also must continue to expand recruitment and training of Foreign Service personnel in State and USAID. No doubt we can and must be more efficient in our programming and human resource systems. Plus State and USAID must deliver on its promises of successful achievement of foreign policy objectives. But first they must be given the opportunity and the resources.

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Focus on the Foundations

Posted on January 28, 2011 by Amb. Litt

Images of downtrodden masses rising up in the streets against autocratic and self-sustaining regimes certainly give encouragement to promoters of democracy. In fact, however, growing unrest in the streets of the Arab world could produce a few alternate outcomes, among them: constructive evolution toward good governance or destructive descent toward anarchy followed by further autocratic controls. We’ve been to this movie on-and-off over the last 60 years: in Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, just to name a few showings at theaters not-too-near you.

It is clear that what differentiates positive outcomes from negative ones, at least from the perspective of economic growth, justice, the protection of human rights, and regional stability, is the existence of relatively sound, transparent, and accountable institutions in the affected countries. America’s reputed ability — like that of Great Britain in the 1950s and 60s – single-handedly to step in and bring resolution to the crisis has vanished. However, wherever the United States and its friends and allies around the world have over the long run promoted and sustained the growth of such institutions – e.g., justice, education, finance and security systems – the outcomes have been somewhat better when political earthquakes strike.

Like it or not, the stability of this region is still vital to our national security, as it has been for decades. We must therefore work hard to support building institutions that promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and the sanctity of human rights. It does us little good to make pronouncements in favor of this or that leader, this or that popular movement, this or that government, if we are not prepared to put our weight, time, and resources (human and financial) behind strong, democratic (i.e., participatory, transparent and accountable) institutions. We should have been doing this all along.

I am more confident of a constructive outcome in Tunisia than I am in, say, Yemen if popular unrest unseats the established government. Tunisia benefits from a stronger economy (despite Yemen’s natural resources—and they are rapidly dwindling), more effective governmental/judicial institutions, and more robust civil society. The likelihood of supremacy of the rule of law in Tunisia is much stronger than in Yemen. This argues for harder work in Yemen to help prepare that nation to withstand the consequences of any current or future popular demonstrations and upheaval.

Compare the 2010 earthquakes in Chile and Haiti: solid foundations, institutions and infrastructure produced a much less disastrous outcome in Chile, which seems to have recovered long ago. Haiti is still groaning a year later under the destruction and rubble of buildings, economy, and government alike.

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Transition to Civilian Lead

Posted on November 22, 2010 by Amb. Litt

Vice President Biden wrote in a NYT op-ed article this weekend about the U.S. transition from military to civilian lead in Iraq. His reinforcement of the notion that America is not “disengaging” from Iraq in the military drawdown applies equally to Afghanistan. In fact the transition in Afghanistan from military to civilian lead will be more complex than that of Iraq, since more coalition partners are involved, the work of developing civilian capacity is more daunting, and the underlying Afghan infrastructure is weaker. I hope that VP Biden’s welcome call for transfering one-third of the military savings expected during the Iraq drawdown to additional funding for Iraq security force development and State Department civilian-led ramp-up, will pertain also to Afghanistan once that transition begins there in 2011. I would consider Biden’s reference to “State Department” as shorthand for USAID and other relevant agencies, along with State.

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Let the Taliban Wait It Out!

Posted on November 19, 2010 by Amb. Litt

I say let the Taliban retreat inside Afghanistan or elsewhere, with the intention of “waiting us out.” While they’re cooling their heels, Afghans across the country – and especially in the South – have the chance to work hard with bilateral donors, international organizations, companies and NGOs, to improve local governance and economic development. Taking advantage of the time and space that security forces provide, the fabric of society will be re-knit, forming an even stronger barrier to Taliban persuasion, wiles, intimidation, and violence. If and when they return, the Taliban will not find the same landscape in Afghanistan as when they left.
It won’t be perfect, but it will be better.

Some of the Taliban might actually take advantage of the hopes for the future that Afghans are building locally, and join a reconciliation and reintegration process, not just because they are tired of the death and destruction caused by their own hand, but also because the new Afghanistan promises a better way. Perhaps some of the initial qualities that the Taliban brought to the table in the mid-90s that made them so attractive to ordinary Afghans – opposition to criminality and corruption, transparency, and freedom from intimidation by warlords and gangs – can be woven into the new fabric to make it stronger. There will be no room, however, for the retrograde policies and practices of the more extreme elements of the Taliban movement in the new Afghanistan.

What all this means is that civilians from other countries must help Afghan citizens, civil society and government institutions while the Taliban tide is out. External military forces, like those of the United States, will gradually be able to reduce their combat missions, as capable Afghan forces take up position; but it will be good governance and economic growth that prevent the return of Taliban extremists, not the size of military forces. The challenge lies with us: our ability to plan, coordinate and implement together with our Afghan counterparts those civilian policies and practices that will lead to a stronger Afghan society.

So, Taliban extremists and men of violence: do stay away for a while so that Afghans can rebuild their country and strengthen their resilience against the likes of you.

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Right-sizing the Federal Workforce

Posted on November 5, 2010 by Amb. Litt

I suppose it is inevitable that the Administration and Congress will reduce the number of Federal employees now as a way to trim the deficit and to trim the size of government. I hope we will not toss the national security baby out with the bloated bathwater. Some civilian agencies, as noted in postings below, are key to our future success in national security policy, and should actually increase parts of their workforce, including Treasury, Commerce, USAID, Justice, and of course the State Department. Other niche functions could be added to that list, such as parts of the Department of Homeland Security.

The Administration should also carefully consider extending the tenure of those civilians in national security roles who are close to retirement but who retain decades of much needed experience. What normally happens is that many retirees are re-hired as consultants for their expertise, but at much higher salaries. This happens because there are not enough experienced officers in the agencies to fill in their place behind them. Therefore, while we still have them in the federal workforce, we should try to keep some of them for a while longer. Later we will surely benefit from their expertise once they move on into the private sector.

Recruiting and retaining are only part of the story – government personnel need new forms of education and training that develop the national security skills required to meet tomorrow’s challenges: the crisis after next. (See my posting of October 27.) Among the most important skills is the ability to trust and work with other organizational cultures military and civilian, public and private, for-profit and voluntary. Moreover, government should not try to recruit enough personnel across all disciplines to do everything. The private and voluntary sectors are perfectly capable of doing the hard work in partnership with skilled national security professionals. We just need the right number of government personnel, with the right expertise. This is largely a management and human resources function.

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