Syria and Iraq: US Leadership for International Intervention

Syria and Iraq demand immediate international intervention. Yet, there is far too much complaining about US reluctance – how little America is doing, how urgent deeper American involvement is, even how the Obama administration is/will be to blame for whatever catastrophes transpire next in both countries. There is a legitimate call for renewed American leadership into each hornets’ nest. But it must come in the context of generating pro-active, collective international political intervention. The stability of the Middle East region is at stake, and there are many stakeholders, not just the United States.

Syria degenerates day by day, and the calls for US military involvement increase. Perhaps military operations are or will soon become necessary, but they alone will not protect US interests. Only a political solution between opposition factions on one side, and the current supporters of the Asad government on the other, will end the carnage and promote the possibility of inclusive, tolerant, participatory government in Syria.

The US can and should lead that charge. Today, Washington and Moscow announced their intention to convene just such a meeting. Good start, but it will need a lot of work, and many international hands to make that happen, especially from within the Middle East region. As I have written before, Iran should join the effort, but not as a way to validate any strategic Iranian role in the Arab Levant.

Political negotiation is understandably repugnant to many militants currently giving their lives against the horrors of the Asad regime. Same for the innocent victims of the regime’s brutality. Same for the innocent victims of opposition violence. But only a political solution derived together with elements of the regime (not Bashar al-Asad) and its supporters will bring peace and stability to Syria. And Syria requires both peace and stability.

The international community can provide, among other things, two diplomatic tools: patient, credible help in mediating this crisis (as has been done for Northern Ireland, for instance), and a subsequent process of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) for most armed elements in the conflict. The “national reconciliation” and DDR processes will especially have to deal with extremist militias on both sides.

Iraq similarly is degenerating day by day. Former US Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffrey argued at USIP recently that fortunately Iraq’s new constitutional institutions still exist and are more or less functioning. That is true, and gives us something to build upon. Nevertheless, such institutions require citizens’ trust in them in order to function effectively. Trust inside Iraq is eroding rapidly, especially on the part of Sunni Arabs. Kurdish/Arab trust is also fragile.

For Iraq, too, some argue that the US must intervene. True. But let’s use our leadership and persuasion to build an international network to weaken centrifugal forces and bolster the rickety Iraq state. The US cannot and should not bear that burden alone.

I’ve seen this movie before in Iraq. I was a senior officer at the US Embassy in Baghdad 2005-2006. The US and UK diplomatic missions worked collaboratively to build Sunni Arab trust in Iraqi institutions. The Sunnis had opted out of elections in early 2005 and veered toward violent resistance to the Shi’a and Kurdish leaderships. The US and UK were nearly alone in cajoling all Iraqi parties to participate in their new system. While we were making some progress toward the end of 2005, most nations were sitting on their hands on the sidelines. I give great credit to the government of Turkey for avoiding actions that might have exacerbated tensions in the north and working to achieve some harmony between the two countries. That has paid off handsomely for both countries. However, many actors were working aggressively against internal Iraqi political cooperation – mainly Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a violent extremists and militias. And egging them on were Iran, al-Qa’ida, and especially Abu Musab al Zarqawi (the late leader of al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia). Their goal: make sure that Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a remain divided antagonists. They succeeded in 2006.

Today the same dynamic appears before us: cooperation between Sunni and Shi’a is rapidly eroding and al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia is on the rise. The US and the UK should work with other global partners and regional players to shore up the Iraqi experiment. Some key Arab players are understandably preoccupied—Egypt and Jordan for instance. But they have a huge stake in the outcome. They should do what they can. But other regional nations must gear up to play a constructive role in one of two ways. They can either work to build hope, confidence and trust among Iraqis, or at least they can work to undermine the destructive elements that are determined to fracture Iraq.

The US can and should take the diplomatic lead to make this happen in Syria and Iraq. If the Obama administration is doing so already, it must announce that loud and clear to the world.

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Reflections on John Nagl’s Lessons from Iraq

Read John Nagl’s op-ed in today’s New York Times. He highlights three nuggets worth extracting from America’s otherwise painful Iraq experience. John is as usual an insightful, experienced voice of military theory and practice. He overlooks, however, a critical dimension in each of the three “lessons” he unfurls.

John’s first lesson was for the American politicians who pushed us into a war that we did not need to fight, for reasons that proved false. But there was in fact a broader cause for which to intervene militarily in Iraq by 2003. The US government and the international community recognized they had no other tools left to force Saddam’s compliance with multiple and repeated UN Security Council resolutions imposed since 1990. Saddam’s regime unquestionably had had programs of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological, and the long-range missiles needed to deploy them. For a dozen years he denied, deceived, and then, when forced to admit their existence, ultimately just refused to account for the alleged prior destruction of physical evidence. That is what inspections were about – to force accountability and compliance. That is what he continuously toyed with the UN over, including even his staunchest supporters. There was never a full accounting for these weapon systems, except the nuclear program, including the whereabouts of missiles and significant amounts of chemical and biological precursors.

The United States rightly took the lead to forge a consensus for military intervention when the UN Security Council was blocked from doing so, principally by Russian and French veto threats. And make no mistake, the international community was also fed-up with Saddam’s flouting international will with impunity. Many were prepared to accept the inevitability of the use of force.  In the fall of 2002 the international community was offering tangible support for military intervention. That includes post-conflict international humanitarian, civil-military, and stabilization operations that would have given the Iraqis the chance to rebuild their nation. The United States squandered that opportunity in late 2002-early 2003 by choosing to become the lead vigilante in a self-organized posse. Others be damned.

The lesson for US politicians therefore is: how does the international community compel compliance on issues that it considers a grave threat? The answer is establishing international consensus on strategies, sticking with it, and building upon it. Take Iran. We applied lessons learned from the ineffective Iraqi sanctions regime to set up a much more stringent, consensus-based, Iranian sanctions regime. The Iranians are looking to negotiate a way out of it, even though there is no international consensus yet for military intervention. Consensus was the key to success in Libya, and is the challenge in Syria. The US eschews military intervention. John Nagl rightly points out that perhaps the United States no longer insists on American boots on the ground to achieve our common strategic interests. Nevertheless, a successful policy toward Syria will require a unified international coalition dedicated to the right outcome. The US can certainly help lead that consensus.

The second lesson was for a US military unprepared for 21st century warfare. Here Nagl draws from his revelatory book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, on the importance of militaries becoming learning institutions. But there is more to the counterinsurgency lesson than just for the military. Contemporary asymmetric threats and COIN strategies require strong, effective, and skilled civilian agencies of government. Military operations prepare for and complement civilian tasks. In fact appropriately resourced diplomacy and development can actually prevent or mitigate instability that too often leads willy-nilly to military intervention. The military should not be expected to do everything in counterinsurgency.

The final lesson was for the American people who have trusted the experiment of an all-volunteer military. It has performed “with enormous distinction” in John’s words, and correctly so. His point is that “the nation owes…a depth of gratitude it can never fully repay.” This is the unquestionable call for continued support to veterans and their families. Absolutely.

The bigger lesson from Iraq, however, is whether our volunteer military and Pentagon civilian corps should be sized differently. The US military leadership understandably resists returning to the draft; it wants a professional, effective fighting force for the nation’s wars. But perhaps we need the draft only when the US government chooses to engage in wars, like Iraq, that require large scale forces. We might not ever want to go down this road again; having more of the American public with a stake in the decision might help us choose better. In either case, we should “right-size” our professional military and civilian defense force for 21st century warfare. Some of the savings could go into developing the other civilian agencies that support our national security and foreign policy – so we don’t have to fight so often. But the opposite is happening: we are broadening the capabilities of our military and civilian defense forces, and starving our diplomatic and development corps. The American people need to weigh in on that decision.

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Litt TV Interview on Iran

On February 20, 2013, UNC-Wilmington TV recorded an interview with me on the subject of Iran. Dr. Remonda Kleinberg, professor of public and international affairs, hosted me on her program The World at Large. The program lasts about 30-minutes and covers such issues as:

  • the history of Iran’s nuclear weapons program;
  • the effectiveness of sanctions against Iran
  • power politics across the region
  • “the marriage of convenience” between Iran and the Syrian government.

 

I welcome comments and conversation on this issue, or any other in my blog posts.

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Book Review: “America’s Other Army”

I have recently reviewed an outstanding book by veteran journalist Nicholas Kralev entitled America’s Other Army: the U.S. Foreign Service and 21st Century Diplomacy. It presents the strongest arguments for better utilization of our nation’s diplomatic and development potential, something with which readers of this weblog will be quite familiar.

This book will not disappoint any casual reader interested in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, it should appeal predominantly to four audiences: those who aspire to become diplomats (what is it like?); those who are current Foreign or Civil Service careerists (what’s the latest scoop on a lot of issues important to us?); legislators, Congressional staff, and other resource providers (why should we rely on the State Department, and fund its operations?); and diplomacy’s principal partner, the US military (what is it you diplomats do in your day job?).

Read more in my review posted on the “American Diplomacy” website.

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Secretary Kerry’s Opportunity in the Sahel

US military forces are upgrading their support to French, Malian, and other African forces in Northern Mali. The latest operation seems to be adding unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities based in neighboring Niger. This is an important step, but by no means sufficient or decisive. Of course, most of us don’t know what other US strategies are in progress for Mali, since the media cover almost exclusively our military decisions. But let me go out on a limb and assume: not much is underway in the civilian realm right now.

Malian and non-Malian extremists have scattered into the desert and the mountains, and that provides some relief. But, the problem is not over; the populations of Northern Mali are still weak, vulnerable, and detached from Malian government support. Military operations will do little to satisfy hunger, deliver justice, or provide health care.

I have argued in this weblog before that the best strategy for countering insurgency – for that is what is happening in Mali – is predominantly civilian in nature. The US government should ramp up governance and economic development programs up in the Sahel region of Africa in coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors. Don’t tell me we can’t afford development programs and diplomacy – these are much cheaper in the short and long run than what will inevitably follow otherwise.

Whenever USAID and the Department of State have offered robust development and governance programs in the Sahel in the past, they usually have met with noticeable success. I was Deputy Chief of Mission in Niamey, Niger, in the early 1990s, when the international community collaborated with the Nigerien government and civil society to end internal violence, involving the Tuareg and others. We helped establish the foundations of that nation’s current multiparty political system – which also now includes the Tuareg people of Niger.

In today’s events in the Sahel, nothing could be more effective in protecting the populations from the predations of violent extremists than robust, targeted, and coordinated development and governance programs. Moreover, these programs should be deliberately designed to enable host nation governments themselves to address the grievances of their most vulnerable populations.

Mali might not be the end of it. What is the situation in northern Chad, southern Libya, eastern Mauritania, or even northern Niger? Do we know? Does the international community have its collective antenna up to prevent the “surprise” that occurred in northern Mali? Secretary Kerry and his diplomacy and development teams have an extraordinary opportunity to make a major difference in this unsettled part of the globe.

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Obama’s Choice for SecDef

Sen. Hagel would make an excellent Secretary of Defense. I’m not a fan of some aspects of Sen. Hagel’s past, and I think that other potential candidates, such as former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy would have made just as good a choice for a variety of reasons — not the least of which is her forward-looking vision. But Sen. Hagel is the President’s choice and that is what matters most.

I met then-Senator Hagel several times in the Middle East during his various tours of conflict zones in which I was serving – often in the company of then-Sen. Joe Biden. His questions, analysis, and opinions were impressive for their pragmatic, common sense approach. He always convinced me that he took his mandate on the Foreign Relations Committee with dead seriousness, and put people first, then policy and resources. I commend to you an assessment of Sen. Hagel’s bona fides — from a decidedly different perspective than my own – in the latest edition of Forbes magazine by contributor Loren Thompson.

Those who try to read tea-leaves about Sen. Hagel’s policy approaches toward Iran, Israel, or Iraq, are barking up the wrong tree (sorry for the mixed metaphor).  What matters most, as with the President’s choice for Secretary of State, is how will the nominee steward a Department so critical to national security, and in light of the daunting human and financial resource challenges, in the transition over the next four years and beyond.  I would note in this regard that Sen. Kerry and Sen. Hagel would make a superb tandem duo.

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The Next Secretary of State

Congress and the media are focused on the wrong issue with respect to Amb. Susan Rice’s suitability as a potential nominee for Secretary of State. President Obama should nominate an institutional leader, obviously someone well versed in foreign affairs, but more importantly, one who will command effectively the bureaucracies of the Department of State and USAID. As the US rethinks the role of the military and the Department of Defense, our diplomatic and development arm should be prepared, resourced, and motivated to shoulder the hard work ahead. 

The near- and medium-term challenges to our global interests and national security involve political instability, trade and economics, science and technology, poverty and disease, among other issues.  These will require a highly capable Department of State and USAID. Funding will be important, but not sufficient. The Foreign and Civil Service cadres require proper stewardship of scarce resources, a motivating vision, and a Secretary who commands the respect and admiration of the institution.  Secretaries Clinton, Powell and Shultz all stand up well to those metrics. Of course, we also need a Secretary who is a capable negotiator and savvy in policy matters, but the US has too often relied on skilled attorneys and brilliant academics when we really needed a credible and capable leader of people. In short, the next Secretary of State should be someone who knows how to build and lead strong, effective institutions, and can persuade Congress to resource them.

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The Roles of Russia and Iran in the Syria Crisis

I have argued that US policy in Syria needs tighter lash-up with Syria’s immediate neighbors and our traditional allies, and more effective public diplomacy about what we are doing and why, especially within the Middle East region.  An end to the violence and a successful transition will move even more quickly with the acquiescence of Russia and Iran. Any move toward US military intervention, however, would set back this possibility. Conversely, we should work diligently with Moscow toward this end, as Damascus relies strategically on the appearance of continued Russian support, and operationally Russia holds an important key to Syrian military supplies.

Tehran is a different story. We try to work with Moscow because Russian compliance and collaboration on a wide variety of other issues are both achievable and important to US interests. Most are not related to the Middle East. Not so with Iran, with whom we maintain a mutually felt adversarial relationship across nearly all dimensions.

I disagree with Vali Nasr’s argument in his recent NY Times op-ed piece that we should bring Iran into the inner circle of stakeholders to affect the outcome of Syria. True, Iran has more sway over the Assad regime’s decisions than does Russia. However, the Islamic Republic’s ulterior motives run counter to the concepts of stability, freedom, dignity and justice in the Arab Levant – despite what Foreign Minister Salehi has argued in the opinion page of the Washington Post.  Contemporary Iran has been trying to project its power over this part of the Arab world for decades, to the consternation of all regional powers – except Assad’s Syria.

We should not ignore the Iranians, but our “coalition of the relevant,” the phrase that Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad has coined in an excellent opinion article in the Washington Post, should not include Iran. Our diplomacy should function in support of the principal regional neighbors Turkey and Jordan, together with the GCC countries. Other global allies are part of that coalition, too. Of course, Iraq and Lebanon have a stake in the outcomes as well, but both are constrained by internal political divisions – in themselves a result of excessive Iranian interference over the years.

The coalition’s challenge is to find the right framework to convince Iran to use whatever influence it has with the Assad regime right now without precondition, and stop all tangible support to it, without any inference that Iran therefore has a legitimate claim to a role in the Levant. The future Syrian government can decide what relationship it would like to have with the Islamic Republic. Barring this, if the Iranian leadership chooses to stand on the sidelines, or worse, continues to support the Assad regime, so be it, and let them face the inevitable consequences.

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The False Appeal of US Military Intervention in Syria

There is much clamor in the media for a stepped-up US military role in Syria to even the military playing field for the opposition, prevent more bloodshed as we said we should in Libya, and “prove” our support for the Syrian opposition.

Leading the charge with American military force will not necessarily hasten the fall of the regime, or affect the destiny of the Syrian revolt in predictable ways. Effective US military intervention requires a strong and committed network of allies, including regional players.  Where in the past that partnership has been absent or flawed, and the US has intervened anyway, we made things worse, not better, in terms of the affected nation’s future. Even military operations called no-fly, no-drive zones, and other “half-way house” interventions are complex, time-consuming, and still require extensive alliances and partnerships.  These operations can work, but not everywhere, or under all circumstances.  The US does not just decide to “enact a no-fly-zone.”

Moreover, by their nature, US military operations, especially in the Middle East, have a strategic downside from the outset that would have to be mitigated through deliberate whole-of-government planning and effective public diplomacy.  This is what was lacking in Iraq, and to some extent in Afghanistan, where we (perhaps unintentionally) squandered decades-long admiration for the United States across all ethnic groups, including the Pashtuns. US military intervention works to “confirm” the arguments of those inside and outside of the region who challenge our strategies and our roles. The mosaic of anti-regime opposition inside Syria contains elements who oppose American involvement. Such adversaries draw strategic advantage in criticizing US military intervention as they struggle to dominate the post-Assad landscape. It could be done, but we would have to anticipate a long uphill climb in countering those messages and their consequences.

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America’s Role in Syria

The Syria crisis is a complex and “wicked” problem for US policy. Our first objectives should be to provide significant humanitarian assistance and do what we can to accelerate an end to the fighting, as Secretary Clinton recently said in South Africa. We are already contributing significant amounts of money and supplies to refugees and internally displaced families, and more will be forthcoming, no doubt, as the situation on the ground shifts. As to helping end the fighting, the best way is to continue to squeeze the regime politically and economically, thereby accelerating defections, and shriveling its ability to re-supply its troops. The US should (and probably already does) supply non-lethal equipment to opposition forces, as well as some training and advice. We should also work with other nations to help Syrian opposition leaders to be more effective politically, especially in unifying Syria’s variegated society for the days following the fall of the regime.

From where I sit, we do not appear to broadcast effectively to the region what we are already accomplishing, as well as why we don’t do other things, such as military action. We have the means to inform Arabic-, Kurdish- and Farsi-speaking audiences about what we are doing, and why. We can also speak directly to the concerns they may have about the insufficiency – or excess, in the eyes of those cynics – of America’s outreach to the Syrian opposition. We must tackle the issues they want to know about, in their own language, and over their favorite media outlets and internet sites. There are, of course, some operations that the US government rightly believes are best kept under wraps.

In my view, America’s primary contribution to the future of Syria lies on the other side of the fall of the Assad regime. As I mentioned, we should be working diligently right now to help promote and support an independent, democratic, pluralistic, and prosperous Syria, respecting the rights of all of its own citizens. We can contribute to the re-establishment of Syrian institutions, but the Syrian people will not need much assistance. They are well-educated, technically skilled, entrepreneurial, and industrious. We should not delude ourselves about how much America can design Syria. Rather, the US should work to help Syria in collaboration with other nations (and definitely not Iran). Our unique strength lies in our soft power: the attraction of our values, our principles, our global leadership. Our diplomatic and development experts have the wherewithal to cultivate that influence beginning now, and in a new future American Embassy presence in Damascus – and even in some day reopening our consulate in Aleppo, closed since 1967.

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